State Regulation of the Economy: Theoretical Foundations and Practice

The article examines the theoretical foundations of state regulation of the economy and its place in contemporary economic policy. Starting from opposing views on the role of the state, it analyzes how conceptions of the permissible limits of market intervention differ. Particular attention is paid to the arguments for regulation: correcting market failures, protecting competition, redistributing income, and stabilizing the business cycle. The paper also considers the limits of state intervention, linked to information asymmetry, lobbying, and bureaucratic costs. Using financial sector regulation and antitrust policy as examples, it shows that the effectiveness of measures depends on the quality of institutions and the consistency of instruments. The article discusses the relationship between rules that constrain state action and the flexibility needed to respond to crises. The conclusion is that the question should be framed not as a choice between “more” and “less” state, but as a search for institutional mechanisms that make regulation predictable and accountable. The study is based on an analysis of scholarly literature and regulatory documents.